PUBLIC COMMUNICATION MODEL IN COMBATING HOAXES AND FAKE NEWS IN AHEAD OF THE 2024 GENERAL ELECTION

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Abstract:

The political discourse leading up to the 2024 elections has contaminated the media landscape with hoaxes and fake news. Communities, candidates, and state actors compete with factual information and positive news and compete with the spread of misinformation and fake news. The rise of hoaxes on social media and fake news circulating in the mass media ahead of the 2024 elections threatens social unity and national integration, as happened in the 2014 and 2019 elections. This article aims to analyze the public communication model used to combat hoaxes and fake news ahead of the 2024 Election carried out by the Ministry of Communication and Information and other stakeholders. The data in this paper is based on qualitative research carried out using data collection techniques through literature searches, including online news, Automatic Identification System machines, observations, and interviews. This study found that the public communication model developed to combat hoaxes and fake news ahead of the 2024 election was ineffective. The fundamental weakness of the public communication model in eradicating hoaxes and fake news lies in the uneven application of law enforcement and sanctions. In addition, several elements of the public communication model have not systematically shown significant and consistent progress. From a macro perspective, this can be understood as the absence of a clear road map and grand design for eliminating hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia. A clear plan or strategy is needed to build a culture that focuses on eradicating hoaxes and fake news in the long term.

Keywords: Combating Hoaxes and Fake News, Ministry of Communication and Information, Public Communication, Social Media, 2024 General Election

INTRODUCTION

The 2014 and 2019 elections were characterized by sarcastic discourse battles on social media and mass media (Iskandar, 2017; Dv et al., n.d.). Social media hoaxes and mass fake news circulated massively. The situation has mostly stayed the same ahead of the 2024 elections on February 14 next year.(Sastramidjaja et al., 2022). Factually, it is even becoming more violent. The main trigger is the ease of using internet-based gadgets or smartphones as a tool or media to produce hoaxes and fake news (Ramadani, 2019). The study conducted by Syahputra et al. (2021) and (Iskandar et al., 2017) shows that the spread of hoaxes and fake news triggers social conflict that leads to a divided society. Therefore, the spread of hoaxes and fake news in mass media before the 2024 General Election is a situation that threatens social segregation and national disintegration.

Many studies have been on eradicating hoaxes and fake news, but few have been concerned with the public communication models and the run-up to the 2024 General Election. Research on public communication models strategically eradicates hoaxes and fake news significantly ahead of the 2024 elections, where hoaxes and fake news are spread and circulated in the community with extraordinary massiveness. The study on combating hoaxes and fake news by Nurlatun et al. (2021), Pitri Megasari (2020), and Sabrina (2019). During these times, existing research tends to discuss the triggers of hoaxes and fake news; Lukman Hakim, Achluddin Ibnu Rochim (2022); Yashila & Athifahputih (2022) mentioned that there are three steps to eradicate hoaxes and news through socialization cooperation, and supervision. Meanwhile, Arwendria Oktavia (2019) examined the eradication of hoaxes on several online news sites with an Islamic background. Accordingly, there are fundamental differences between previous research and this research. One of the main differences is the use of the public communication model and the run-up to the 2024 General Election.

The purpose of this article is to describe the public communication model applied in combating hoaxes and fake news ahead of the 2024 elections. It also exposes the shortcomings or weaknesses of the public communication model. Of course, it will analyze the public communication model's implications. This article attempts to answer two main questions. First, what is the public communication model for combating hoaxes and fake news before the 2024 elections in Indonesia? Second, what are the shortcomings or weaknesses of the public communication model for combating hoaxes and fake news before the 2024 elections in Indonesia? Thus, research on public communication models in combating hoaxes and fake news ahead of the 2024 elections finds its momentum and significance.

This article departs from three reasons. First, the presence of a public communication model determines the level of success or failure in combating hoaxes and fake news ahead of the 2024 elections. Second, hoaxes and fake news can only be combatted with a patterned, systematic, and sustainable effort. Third, combating hoaxes and fake news encourages digital literacy and responsible press freedom. Also, it accelerates the creation of a democratic society in Indonesia. Hoaxes and fake news are difficult to combat for several reasons, including low public media literacy, weak law enforcement, and the absence of a systematic roadmap and grand design.

METHODS

The object of this study is a public communication model for combating hoaxes and fake news before the 2024 elections. The subject of this study is interesting because the discourse battle among the candidates, from political parties, presidential and vice presidential candidates, candidates for central legislative members, and provincial and district/city levels, are promptly working to build

an image in the community through mass media and social media. In these social and mass media, hoaxes and fake news are produced and disseminated.

This study uses a qualitative approach. The qualitative approach seeks and finds an understanding of phenomena in a particular contextualized setting. In this case, the context studied is the public communication model for combating hoaxes and fake news ahead of the 2024 elections.

The data collection techniques used were interviews, observation, and literature review. Interviews were conducted with six informants. They are one informant from the Ministry of Communication and Information, one person from a civil society organization, two people from a journalist organization, and two people from professionals or academics. The selection of the informants was aimed at representing the stakeholders. Meanwhile, observations were made of the data presented by the machine that captures hoaxes and fake news owned by Kemenkominfo, namely the Automatic Identification System (AIS). The news presented by Media Network Group and Republika Group was also monitored.

The data collected, including interviews, observations, and literature data, were then all displayed. The next step is to sort and select the data and findings in the field based on the categorization needed during the writing of this paper. Moreover, all data were eliminated according to the study's needs. Data processing must be adapted to the study framework. Unnecessary data was discarded, and finally, the data were analyzed, and conclusions were drawn.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The study results: combating hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia has several legal foundations. These include Law Number 1 Year 1946 Article 14 on Criminal Law Regulations. Article 263 of Law Number 1 of 2023 concerning the Criminal Code (KUHP). Additionally, there is Law Number 19 of 2016 concerning Amendments to Law Number 11 of 2008 concerning Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE Law), Articles 14 and 15 of Law No. 1 of 1946, Articles 311 and 378 of the Criminal Code, and Law Number 40 of 2008 concerning the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination. Law Number 11 of 2008 on Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE Law): The ITE Law has provisions prohibiting the dissemination of misleading and deceptive information. Article 28, paragraph (1) of the ITE Law states that every person who intentionally and without proper distributes, transmits, and makes accessible Electronic Information and Electronic Documents with insulting or defamatory content.

Law No. 40/1999 on the Press is formulating the applicable rules, particularly for the news. The Press Law regulates press freedom, although it obligates the media to present accurate, balanced, and non-misleading information. Violations are subject to administrative or criminal sanctions. Presidential Regulation No. 43/2018 on the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: This regulation provides a legal basis for the government to fight hoaxes and fake news related to terrorism issues. Other than those laws, some regulations serve as the legal basis for combating hoaxes and fake news, such as decrees and regulations from the Ministry of Communication and Information and the Indonesian National Police.

The two images shown below describe the findings and types of hoaxes that the Ministry of Communication and Information's Automatic Identification System (AIS) has successfully tracked from 2018-2023. There were 11,357 hoaxes and fake news identified by AIS. In Figure 1, it can be seen that the issue of hoaxes was extraordinarily high or reached its peak during the 2019 elections. The number of hoaxes decreased as the political tension leveled off after the 2029 elections. The figure also explains that hoaxes have increased again along with the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020-2022. It is not unexpected, as reflected in Figure 2, that the highest number of hoaxes is in healthcare,

with 2,256 items. Followed by the government (2,075), which manages the Covid-19 pandemic. Political hoaxes are in fourth position with 1,355 items. Usually, political hoaxes are closely correlated with religious issues, with 336 items. The correlation between politics and religion can be understood because most of Indonesia's population is religious. Therefore, it is normal for religion to be a 'sexy' issue to be exploited in discourse battles. During the first quarter of 2023, Kemenkominfo identified 425 hoax issues circulating on websites and digital platforms. This number is higher than in the first quarter of 2023, which reached 393 hoax issues (https://www.kominfo.go.id.2023).

Figure 1. Hoax Issue Findings Resulted from the Ministry of Communication and Information's Automatic Identification System (AIS) Processing (Period of August 2018 – March 31, 2023)
(https://www.kominfo.go.id. 2023)

Figure 2. The Categories of Hoax Issues Resulted from the Ministry of Communication and Information's Automatic Identification System (AIS) Processing (Period of August 2018 – March 31, 2023)
(https://www.kominfo.go.id. 2023)

As reported by Masyarakat Anti Fitnah Indonesia (Mafindo), there has been a shift in hoaxes and fake news from the 2019 to 2024 elections. If, in the 2019 elections, text and images were the weapons of hoaxes and fake news, now approaching the 2024 elections, video hoaxes and fake news

have dominated. Mafindo data shows that in the January- March 2023 period, there was an increase in political hoaxes and fake news circulating. That is, from 31.1 percent to 36.2 percent. The main targets of hoaxes and fake news before the 2024 elections are political parties, legislative candidates, presidential and vice-presidential candidates, election organizers, media, and survey institutions. "The weakness of the current eradication of hoaxes and fake news is in criminal and social sanctions," said Mafindo Presidium Chairman Septiaji Eko Nugroho. "Many violations have already entered the criminal realm but are not being prosecuted by the police. Similarly, with social sanctions, people quickly forget about them. Eventually, there is no deterrent effect for the creators and spreaders of hoaxes and fake news."

From the viewpoint of a lecturer at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), Gun Gun Heryanto, there are four causes of hoaxes and fake news leading up to the 2024 elections. First, supportive efforts among the public increase the escalation of conflict between them. Second, discourse battles involve mass media and social media. This leads to framing among media-supporting candidates. Third, there is an increase in echo chambers or conversation pools. Fourth, the presence of a relatively new communication network with the emergence of interests to support each candidate. Therefore, it is typical for hoaxes and fake news to spread in every political contestation. "However, the spread of hoaxes and fake news is not entirely in the public, but there are also political party actors and state actors. So the responsibility must also fall on platforms, political parties, and state actors," said Southeast Asia Freeedom of Expression Network (Safenet) researcher Ika Ningtyas Unggarini.

Public Communication Model Construction. There are many ways, methods, and techniques to eradicate hoaxes and fake news generally, whether through traditional methods (mass directives and meetings), modern (through public mass media), or digital (using automatic hoax and fake news detection machines). In the context of hoaxes and fake news before the 2024 elections, the Ministry of Communication and Information (MOCI) is the leading agency responsible in general. Kemenkominfo cooperates technically with the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Indonesian National Police, the Election Supervisory Agency, and the General Election Commission. In this work, Kemenkominfo also invites and cooperates with social organizations, religious organizations, non-governmental organizations, academics, and universities.

Specifically, six components contribute to the public communication model to combat hoaxes and fake news, which include increasing media and information literacy. According to Gun Gun Heryanto, media literacy has three essential components. Those are increasing knowledge, increasing skills and skills, and strengthening anti-hoax and fake news attitudes. The three components must run in parallel and complement each other. If one of these components is not working, then it is sure that media literacy will not function. On the other hand, Taufik Hidayat, Head of Public Relations of the Ministry of Communication and Information, added that the literacy increase can be seen in the data index owned by the Ministry of Communication and Information. There has been an increase in digital literacy. However, it is generally unsatisfactory because the scale has yet to be achieved. Digital literacy is measured by four components: Digital Skill, Digital Ethics, and Digital Safety. Digital Culture.

Digital Skill is a pillar in the rising 2022 Digital Literacy Index. One of the highest indicators in this pillar is the ability to download files. The lowest indicator is the ability to search for true or false information. Digital Ethics is the pillar whose score increased significantly and is the largest among other pillars. The contribution to the increase in this pillar comes from several indicators with high scores, such as encouraging people not to make negative comments (index 4.07) and not sharing

screenshots on social media (index 3.97). The indicator with the lowest index is respondents who will not directly share accident information.

Digital Safety is one of the pillars that experienced the slightest increase. This pillar mainly contributes to the indicator of being accustomed to creating secure passwords with a combination of numbers, letters, and punctuation marks. In contrast, the indicator of the ability to distinguish e-mails containing spam/virus/malware contributed the least. Digital Culture was the only pillar whose index declined from the previous year, although it was still the pillar with the highest score. In this pillar, most had indexes between 3.8 and 3.9. Only one index has a score below that range, which is putting the author's name when reposting, at 3.57. The National Digital Literacy Index figure above explains that the National Digital Literacy Index 2022 increased by 0.05 points to 3.54 from the index achievement in 2021. Three pillars increased, namely Pillar 1 (Digital Skill) increased by 0.08 points, Pillar 2 (Digital Ethics) increased by 0.15 points, and Pillar 3 (Digital Safety) increased by 0.02 points. However, Pillar 4 (Digital Culture) decreased by 0.06 points. Digital Skill is one of the 2022 Digital Literacy Index pillars that increased.

Septiaji Eko Nugroho added that digital literacy must continue to be promoted as a provision to the community when the use of smartphones is widely popular. Based on experience in the field, smartphone users do not use it because of learning. More than literacy is required. Innovation is required to improve media and information literacy. A strategy is necessary regarding learning about digital literacy. "Literacy has yet to be comprehensive and systematic; it is still limited to a project from the Ministry of Communication and Information and thus less than optimal. All of its implementation cannot be separated from the strategy and framework of the Ministry of Communication and Information. So, the current literacy is top-down, not bottom-up. Media and digital literacy have not yet become a culture in Indonesia," Ika Ningtyas Unggarini.

Secondly, the development of an automatic detection system. Kemenkominfo has established a harmful content-crawling machine to counteract negative content. It is called the Automatic Identification System (AIS). According to Taufik Hidayat, this machine operates 24 hours a day and seven days a week. The AIS machine uses artificial intelligence (AI) to determine harmful content quickly. The AIS machine works by crawling and classifying millions of links detected as harmful content. The monitoring results will be followed up with handling blocking access, deactivating the content, and forwarding it to the relevant agencies.


Figure 3. Mechanism and Workflow of MOCI's Automatic Identification System (AIS) Machine Owned By Kemenkominfo (MICO)

Three teams continuously operate the AIS machine. The mechanism and main tasks are receiving and managing reports and complaints from the public and agencies, blocking harmful internet content, and limiting internet and social media access. Each team produces daily reports on trending social media issues, popular issue analysis, and hashtag analysis. Furthermore, the AIS team also works to conduct profiling cyber patrols and create hoax issue reports. There is also social media account verification, e-commerce analysis, and special handling of terrorism and radicalism content.

Meanwhile, Mafindo said Septiaji Eko Nugroho has not yet had an automatic detection tool that can read whether it is hoax news, which is possible from the digital platform itself. In the future, Mafindo will try to have a platform machine. Previously, the hoaxes received by Mafindo were only based on reports from volunteers and communities formed in various regions. The presence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology will be beneficial to detect hoaxes and fake news.

Third, collaboration between social media platforms and news publishers. The Press Council is responsible in this context. It has the right to verify news publishers or mass media. In collaboration with various journalism and mass media organizations, the Press Council is the gatekeeper and trigger point for collaboration between social media platforms and news publishers. The condition of verified media is still minimal, only five percent of 47 thousand items (Hasibuan, 2023). Some platforms like Google and Facebook engage in creating modules to help the media verify news content. There is also training for filtering. The problem is how Google and Facebook prioritize content from mass media or fake news sites that become cannibals of mainstream media content. Video, news, and information from channels not verified by the Press Council frequently appear.

In the opinion of Ika Ningtyas Unggarini, the media must be responsible for the rise of hoaxes and fake news. Trust in the media is declining. One of the reasons is that many media owners are involved in politics. However, there are now many alternative and independent media spreading credible news. "The Press Council has verified the Republika Group. The Republika Group has a guidebook for producing news. Also, the distribution through social media is by a separate professional team, not news-producing journalists," said Republika Deputy Editor-in-Chief Nurhassan Murtaji.

Fourth, the penalty and punishment factor. Indeed, the element of penalty and punishment determines the eradication of hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia. Unfortunately, to this day, the element of penalty and punishment has become a fundamental weakness. The main trigger is the presence of political buzzers operating through thousands of fake accounts on various social media, especially approaching the 2024 elections. In the January-September 2022 period, the National Police only prosecuted 113 cases of fake news. Polda Metro Jaya, which covers the Jabodetabek working area, took the most action with 24.10 percent or 27 cases (Pusiknas et al.., 2023).

Fifth, cooperation with other stakeholders. The Ministry of Communication and Information (MOCI) is generally the coordinator of all these stakeholders. Taufik Hidayat and Septiaji Eko Nugroho revealed that the collaboration with other stakeholders, such as experts and academics, has been going well with intense meetings. They also communicate through social media such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Therefore, many studies have been conducted by experts, academics, communities, and non-governmental organizations on literacy.

"If the state/government is serious about combating hoaxes and fake news, especially in the long term, media literacy should be included in the school curriculum in all types and levels of education," said Ika Ningtyas Unggarini. "That is why the involvement of stakeholders in the fight against hoaxes and fake news is significant. Platforms must be involved to improve content

moderation policies and make them more transparent. The government, on the other hand, should improve the existing regulations. The government takes responsibility for and supervises the policy or content moderation on the platform. The government should also conduct comprehensive and more systematic digital literacy.

Sixth, public awareness campaigns. In order to raise public awareness, socialization and campaigns conducted by various institutions concerned with combating hoaxes and fake news have been quite massive. Socialization should be carried out through educational institutions from kindergarten to university level. In addition, direct counseling and mass media involving various social and religious institutions should also be done. Even through members of the DPR during working visits and meeting with constituents during recess. Formal, non-formal, and informal communities continue to be encouraged. However, none of this is enough because those who spread hoaxes and fake news are even more active. The role of Kemenkominfo and Polri has often promoted and socialized the fight against hoaxes and fake news. However, literacy has not yet become a culture in the society. Unfortunately, this is one of the problems we face. More massive education from the government to the public about digital literacy is urgently needed.

This study has several significant findings, including that the public communication model for combating hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia before the 2024 elections has three stages. The upstream stage prioritizes and relies on literacy education. The second stage is continuous assistance to oversee the program. Finally, the downstream stage is law enforcement as a last resort if the upstream and middle stages are unsuccessful. With these three layers of awareness, the negative impact of hoaxes and fake news can be minimized.

First, there are several weaknesses in the public communication model to combat hoaxes and fake news. First, law enforcement is weak, especially against political buzzers assumed to be nurtured by the authorities (Syahputra et al., 2021)). Almost no political buzzers from the ruling circles have been convicted for spreading hoaxes and fake news (Sugiono, 2020). On the contrary, many civilians who speak out or oppose government policies have been convicted (SANTOS-D'AM ORIM & Fernandes de Oliveira MIRANDA, 2021); (Neyasyah, 2020). Within this context, law enforcement officials (police) have played practical politics. At the same time, law enforcers should be neutral state officials who are only subject to the law, not government officials interested in the continuity of power. (Simons & Manoilo, 2021); (Suparno & Sukinta, 2021).

Second, there are no effective social sanctions that make the perpetrators deterrent. The form of social sanctions for the perpetrators of hoaxes and fake news needs to be formulated in the fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), discussed by Nahdhatul Ulama in the Bahtsul Masail forum and or in the Muhammadiyah Tarjih and Tajdid Assembly forum or similar forums in various religious organizations (Aufa & Aufa, 2022) and social-community organizations (Septiadi et al., 2020). Furthermore, in addition to coercive and imperative punishments, social sanctions are needed to suppress and reduce the spread of hoaxes and fake news. There are many forms of social sanctions. They include scolding, warning, isolation, and expulsion from the organization that provides them.

Third, there is no roadmap and macro design for combating hoaxes and fake news from upstream to downstream. During this time, eradicating hoaxes and fake news has only been incidental, temporary, and case-by-case, resulting in ad hoc task forces. The collaboration of stakeholders to fight against hoaxes and fake news has not been organized properly and systematically. Each stakeholder in eradicating hoaxes and fake news operates individually with its agenda. In this sense, combating hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia is not a massive, systematic, and futuristic movement (Nurlatifah, 2019).

Fourth, there is a lack of Automatic Identification System (AIS) machines. The fight against hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia should be more aggressive and systematic. One of the ways is to increase the number of Automatic Identification System (AIS) machines. Their existence must be distributed to various groups combating hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia. There is only one Automatic Identification System (AIS) at the Ministry of Communication and Information. Therefore, the state should multiply them and distribute them to community organizations such as Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhamadiyyah, the Press Council, the National Police, universities, and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS); the more Automatic Identification System (AIS) machines operate, the more influential the eradication of hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia.

Fifth, there are two most significant challenges in media and digital literacy (Upton, 2021); (Media Literacy Now, 2017); (Lähdesmäki et al., 2022), including the upcoming 2024 elections, which are virality on social media and capitalism in mass media. Virality on social media is still the most significant desire and strategy of the public, political parties, and state actors, even though the posts are wrong, malicious, and harmful to other parties. "What matters is going viral" is an ideology that hinders the eradication of hoaxes and fake news. (Bernatta & Kartika, 2020); (Liang, 2018) Meanwhile, capitalism in the mass media manifests in the size of clickbait, page view standards, and the production of news quantity (Hadiyat, 2019); (Munger et al., 2018); (Zhou, 2022); (Kaushal & Vemuri, 2021); (Lischka & Garz, 2021). Spreading information and news links is one way to viralize political support before the 2024 elections. Like, comment, and share is still a magic mantra to support their favorite political candidates.(Patel et al., 2019; Tenenboim, 2022; Profile, 2020). The spread of hoaxes and fake news can decrease public trust in the mainstream media (Fita Fathurokhmah, 2016). At the same time, the media is the oxygen of democracy. (Freeze et al., 2021; Neyazi et al., 2022; Dame Adjin-Tettey, 2022).

To prevent the spread of hoaxes and fake news, anti-hoax and fake news activists and scholars can do at least four things. First, conduct ongoing and sustained research. This research is essential to map and find problems, patterns, and trends in the spread of hoaxes and fake news (Arwendria & Oktavia, 2019). This is because the spread of hoaxes and fake news changes dynamically. It replaces even more complicated indications (Khosiah & Rohmiyati, 2019; Sabrina, 2019). Second, there is a need to build networks among anti-hoax and fake news activists and academics. Activists and academics can no longer act individually, separately, or suffer from the virus of "megalomania." Combating hoaxes and fake news requires cross-disciplinary collaboration and expertise to ensure that efforts are integrated, comprehensive, and systematic (Bahri, 2021). Third, anti-hoax and fake news activists and academics offer themselves as expert witnesses in the courts of law to increase the punishment of those who are proven to be spreading hoaxes and fake news. Fourth, anti-hoax and Fakenews activists and academics create and lead communities of people who spread anti-hoax and Fakenews narratives (Akmelia Rizki et al., 2021).

Anticipating public communication weaknesses, the spread of hoaxes and fake news can be minimized before the 2024 elections by implementing the media literacy movement simultaneously. This will ensure that the political contestation in the 2024 elections will be accompanied by healthy and enlightening information. The fight against hoaxes and fake news in the run-up to the 2024 elections should ideally be a two-way approach, top-down and bottom-up. The State/Government operates the Automatic Identification System (AIS) machines across various institutions. Meanwhile, the public reports the spread of hoaxes and fake news to law enforcement officials based on their awareness, not on political or ideological motives, as it happens today (Tandoc et al., 2018).

CONCLUSION

The most crucial finding in this study is what seems to be an apparent paradox. On the one hand, the government has created a public communication model to combat hoaxes and fake news before the 2024 elections. However, on the other hand, the government protects the creators of hoaxes and fake news made by state actors. This condition makes combating hoaxes and fake news (at a macro level) in Indonesia even more difficult. In a low media and digital literacy culture, it is increasingly difficult to implement the hoax and fake news eradication model in Indonesia. Challenges and obstacles in combating hoaxes and fake news come from outside and internal threats that must be addressed first.

It must be recognized that media and digital literacy have yet to become a culture in Indonesia. All efforts to civilize media and digital literacy must be fully supported by adequate software, hardware, and brainwave. This is where the government and civil organizations' role and contribution find momentum. Combating hoaxes and fake news in Indonesia requires a long time, patience, extra effort, and the right strategy. There is still much homework to be done by the stakeholders of the public communication model to combat hoaxes and fake news. Law enforcement and sanctions tend to be preferential and selective; law enforcement is still a power tool.

This study has limitations because it focuses exclusively on the public communication model in combating hoaxes and fake news during the 2024 elections. This means several segments, elements, and parts of combating hoaxes and fake news have not been explored. Therefore, future studies can go even further. It can use content analysis through qualitative and quantitative approaches to hoax and fake news texts before the 2024 election. It can also use virtual ethnography or ethnography about the interactions that occur in the virtual world about hoaxes and fake news before the 2024 election.

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